Natureview Yogurt Essay Example for Free

Natureview Yogurt Essay Natureview Farm has a few basic goals in this case. Goal 1: Natureview needs to increase its revenues to $20 million before the end of 2001. Goal 2: Natureview must maintain its strong brand image. Goal 3: Natureview must not turn its back on its loyal customers, suppliers, and distributors. Strengths * Natureview produces yogurt with a family recipe that uses completely natural ingredients and is also organic. Natureview does not use milk from cows that are artificially enhanced with hormones. * Natureview yogurt has an average shelf life of 50 days, which is significantly higher than the competition’s shelf life. * Natureview deploys low-cost guerilla marketing. * Natureview is the leader in market share for yogurt in the Natural Foods Channel, holding 24% of the market share. * Strong brand image. Weaknesses * Natureview’s retail prices are significantly higher than the yogurt options in supermarkets. * Natureview currently only offers single 8-ounce cups and 32-ounce cups of yogurt. Natureview does not offer multipack yogurt products. * Natureview sells in a niche market of consumers who want organic yogurt. * Natureview must deal with a longer distribution channel compared with companies who operate in the supermarkets. Opportunities * Natureview operates in the organic foods market, which was predicted to grow from $6.5 billion in 1999 to $13.3 billion in 2003. * Organic yogurt was predicted to grow 20 percent per year from 2001 to 2006. * One product Natureview does not produce, multipacks, represented 9 percent of total yogurt sales in supermarkets, and was growing by 12.5 percent per year. * Natureview does not sell in supermarkets, but 97 percent of all yogurt consumed is bought in supermarkets. Furthermore, 46 percent of organic food customers bought organic products at supermarkets, compared to 29 percent who bought organic products at natural foods markets. * The overall market for yogurt is huge. 40 percent of the U.S. population consumes yogurt, with 70 percent of the purchasers being men. Threats * Horizon Organic has cash flows from a recent IPO and might gain first mover advantage into supermarkets. * Major companies, like Dannon, are rumored to be entering into the organic yogurt market. * As organic food becomes more popular, natural food markets may begin doing business as supermarkets do, which requires slotting fees and participation in trade promotions. Financial Analysis The financial analysis of the situation will begin with a look at the analysis of the yogurt costs, revenues, and margins in the natural food channel and the supermarket channel. Working backwards from the margins given in the case, and also Exhibit 3 of the case, which shows production costs and retail prices for yogurts by size and channel, a full set of numbers can be produced (see Figures 1 through 6).

Sexual orientation and the Environment Essay Example for Free

Sexual orientation and the Environment Essay Psychology in everyday life second edition is a great book with lots of great information. But I find myself disagreeing with you on chapter four Environment and Sexual Orientation. I think that environmental factors have a lot to do with sexual orientation. You asked four questions: is homosexuality linked with problems in a child’s relationship with parents, does homosexuality involve a fear or hatred of people of the other gender, is sexual origination linked with levels of sex hormones, and as children were many homosexuals victimized? I think that all of those things including your environment can be a deciding factor in your sexual orientation. Sexual orientation is an enduring sexual attraction towards members of either our own or other sex. I think your environment plays one of the biggest roles in your sexual ordination because your environment influences the thing that you do. As a child you’re very young and impressionable it’s just like monkey see, monkey do. Our parents affect our relationships because our parents are the first relationship we see and as a child everything we see our parents do we mimic. There for If we grow up around a same sex relationship and you are used to seeing that in your everyday situation that is what you are use to and you may feel like that’s the way you want to live your life. So from what you saw as a child made you choose to be in a same sex relationship. I also think that the kind of relationships that you have with your parents also affects our sexuality. The relationship with your parents is one of the most influence relationships that you have in your life so it can very much have a positive or a negative effect on you. For example you growing up having a bad relationship with your dad may leave the impression that all men are dogs. That may cause you to drift away from the opposite sex. A male could have a horrible relationship with his mother leaving a bad impression of woman causing him to have ell feelings towards women because he never experienced a good relationship with his mom. I think there are a lot of different factors in some one big attracted to the same sex. Also someone being victimize as a child can cause them to be homosexual I don’t think that is the cause for every on but I do think it played a factor in some peoples lifestyle choice. Would that be the cause for everyone no not at all but it would be for some. Like genetic influences for example, shared sexual orientation is higher among identical twins than among fraternal twins. There are also brain differences for example gay men’s hypothalamus reacts as do straight women’s to the smell of sex-related hormones. Also the mother’s immune system may play a role in the development of sexual orientation. Another interesting fact is that men who have older brothers are somewhat more likely to be gay about one third more likely for each additional older brother. Altered prenatal hormones exposure may lead to homosexuality in humans and other animals. Also right handed men with several older biological brothers are more likely to be gay, possibly due to a maternal immune system reaction. Homosexuality does appear to run in families homosexual men have more homosexual relatives on their mother’s side than on their father’s as you can see yes there are a lot of different things that can go into someone becoming gay. But my opinion that I think your environment plays the biggest role as it does for anyone else. Your environment shapes and moles you as a person. It might not be the deciding factor to what makes you gay, but I think it plays a big role. In the situation . So based on these findings I would have to disagree with you I very much do believe that your environment plays a huge role in your sexual orientation. I would like to think you for your time, and I think that chapter four has brought some very good insight and I have learned a lot. You made some very valet point’s thank you again for your insight.

History of Nationalism in Israel

History of Nationalism in Israel Promised Land, Crusader State: The Rise, Fall and Return of the Covenant Nation A dissertation submitted by 58126 to the Department of Government, the London School of Economics and Political Science, in part completion of the requirements for the MSc in Comparative Politics (Conflict Studies) September 1st, 2008 Word Count: ABSTRACT Several prominent comparativists claim that Israel is an outlier case a unique case study that generally defies most conventional forms of categorization. Such an allegation naturally assumes Israel to be exceptional and its behavior inexplicable. The assumption of Israels uniqueness was born during the marked epistemological shift from behavioral crossnational inquiries to more contextually and historically-derived theories, and has undermined Israels place in comparative politics. This dissertation seeks to place Israel and its behavior squarely back into the mix and up against much of the same scrutiny faced by other nation-states. By shifting again from a contextually and historically-derived theory of nationalism towards a more cognitive and tradition-based approach, centered on the ethno-symbolic approach professed by Anthony D. Smith and John Hutchinson, elements of Israels nationalism and national identity are analyzed as contributing to its existence as a zone of conflict a nd to its violent behavior. An analysis of the Covenant Nation as a new comparative category that presupposes the idea of; (i) a chosen people, in (ii) a Promised Land, that uses (iii) blood sacrifice in order to fulfill a redemptive destiny and a commitment to worldly salvation, is highlighted. Limited comparisons to other covenant nations are drawn where applicable. Introduction: Since 1948, Israel has been regarded by some as an occupying force in the Middle East. That Israel, and Jews in general, could be a conquering and occupying people given their fate in the first half of the twentieth century as a nation without a home, victims of anti-Semitism and persecution is confusing to many. For reasons such as this, Israel has long been considered an outlier case by political scientists (Barnett 1996, ch.1). To the point of emphasis, it is argued that Israel defies most categorization, which has become the methodology employed by comparativists in order to understand states and state behavior. Categorizing usually requires classifying a case study under dichotic, or opposite, adjectives; Israel being neither East nor West, developed nor underdeveloped, capitalist nor socialist, Third World nor First World therefore, becomes difficult to study (Barnett 1996, 7). Furthermore, Israel has routinely been excluded from geographically specific studies or regional studies, since it is often considered an alien entity in the Middle East. However, despite Israels historical particularity, Israel is not an alien entity in the Middle East and its behavior is not inexplicable. While differences certainly exist categorically between Israel and other states, they both nevertheless share many of the same traits and concerns characteristics that might have similar origins. It will be argued that in order to understand Israel, both as a nation-state and as it behaves, one needs to understand Israeli nationalist sentiments. Nationalism in itself is a difficult thing to define. Where does it come from? What does it entail? How deeply is it entrenched? The answers to these questions, and many like them, could explain why a nation-state behaves in the way that it does. There are two major competing schools of thought when it comes to understanding nationalism, (a) the modernists, and (b) the primordialists. The modernists would date nationalism to industrialism, the development of capitalism, or to the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars. The primordialists, on the other hand, see nationalism as dating back much farther possibly to even before history was recorded. Under this train of thought, Israel might date its nationalism back to the Hebrew Bible. Essentially, it all depends on where in history one chooses to draw the line. This paper will primarily argue that in order to understand Israel as an inherently violent and conflict-laden nation-state it is necessary to move away from the established contextually-derived theories of nationalism and move to one that is more cognitively based. In so doing, this paper will show that Israel is in fact a state like all others. It is not an anomaly, nor methodologically suspect its behavior not inexplicable. Regardless of its ancient historic roots, and despite its recent induction as a state among the family of nations, Israels nationalism should not be analyzed according to the dates of its borders, citizens, infrastructure, or institutions. In a more cognitive approach, Israels nationalism should be understood by the borders, beliefs and people themselves. As such, it will be shown that Israel is the archetypical Covenant Nation a category that exists free from both time and space. Such a theory of nationalism can thus draw on elements from either modern or pr e-modern periods/approaches and need not be based on regional developments or similarities. Israel, like all covenant nations, is inherently conflict-laden. As will be laid out in much greater detail, covenant nations have a strategic culture born of three identifying features/beliefs that make them violent and militaristic in nature. Covenant nations are under a seemingly contractual obligation to defend and secure the idea of; (i) a chosen people, in (ii) a Promised Land, using (iii) blood sacrifice. When the covenant nation theory is highlighted as the root cause of violence, it becomes clear that a solution to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict becomes much more difficult to ascertain. Conflict becomes unrelated to geopolitical realities or existing/imagined security dilemmas, but to an embedded sense of national superiority, a contractual obligation to fulfill the prophecy of the covenant and, derivatively, a commitment to worldly salvation. Thus, while many scholars claim Israel is an outlier case like no other, they are wrong from the outset by trying to assign Israel to conventional and contextual comparativist categories. Israel and its behavior can and should be understood much the same as other states as reactive to its nationalist sentiments, wherever derived. As will be shown, Israel has always been a conquering and occupying nation. It was true of Israels ancient past, it is true of its present and unless a drastic change occurs deep within the embedded (and sacred) structure of Zionism, it will be true of its distant future. The Nation General Definitions and Theories Quest ce-quune nation? Renans question still echoes after more than a century. In recent decades throughout the historical milieu referred to as the post-colonial era a copious amount of interest and attention has been dedicated to the study of nationalism. While no singular definition is agreed on by scholars, for the purpose of this paper a nation will be defined generally as a group that defines itself or is defined by others as sharing common descent and culture [] that also has political consciousness, claiming collective political rights in a given territory (Mann 2005, 11). A nation-state can thus be defined as an entity wherein a nation has its own sovereign state, situated within enunciated and politically defined territorial borders be they universally recognized or not. Scholars of various disciplines have attempted to provide an explanation for the rise, meaning and development of nationalism in human history and societies. The phenomenon of the constitution of nations and national identities, the emergence of national sentiments, the construction of nationhood and nationalist ideologies, appear to all be interrelated constituents of a single phenomenon. Nevertheless, competing theories of nationalism exist the major schism existing between modernists and primordialists. Modernists, such as Gellner and Anderson, assume that the origins of nations and nationalism lie in the structural changes that affected economic and social systems during the industrial revolution at the end of the eighteenth century (Gellner 2006, 48-49), implicitly denying cultural factors. In the opinion of the modernists, the introduction of new means of production and the division of labor caused a restructuring of social relations and the polarization of class interests. Nationalism emerged as a means to promote and direct change through the creation of a popular solidarity as well as a means to protect and promote class interests (Anderson 1991, 113-114). The prevalence of one intention over another brings about the constitution of different political organizations depending on the nature the political system. So to speak, nationalism is identified by the modernists with the process of nation-building a nation being a mere artificial construction fuelled by class interests. The primordialist notion of nationalism contrasts with that proposed by the modernists. Scholars such as Hastings, Smith and Geertz, believe that nations are natural givens (Hastings 1997, 5). Consequently, it is possible to find traces of nationalism and nationhood in ancient times. The feeling of belonging, the acknowledgement among a group of people sharing common cultural, racial, linguistic traits, a common ancestry, history or religion, is a documented fact in history (Smith 1994, 40). Groups tended to bind together by these ties. The proclivity to coalesce around these shared traits, or focal points, brought about the rise of politically and socially organized nations claiming sovereignty over a territory. In fact, it is Anthony D. Smiths many contributions to the theory of ethnosymbolism in particular that figure most prominently in a discussion of Israeli nationalism, and upon which I have based my initial observations and thesis. Ethnosymbolism is founded on the historical origins of nations particularly to their roots in premodern times and focuses its attention on perceptions, beliefs, symbols, rituals, and shared myths and memories. Although the ethnosymbolic approach focuses on subjective cultural and symbolic rudiments, their long term patterning produces a structure of relations and processes [] which can provide a framework for the socialization of successive generations of ethnic and national members (Smith 1999, 14). In more basic terms, the origin and descent of the community are recollected and transmitted to new members of the group by memory as interpreted by earlier generations. This subjective version of a nations origins is understood through ethnohistory rather t han any official historians lens (Coughlan 2001, 160). Before turning to the difference between history and historical traditions on Israeli national identity and behavior in the following section, allow me to first part ways with Anthony D. Smith and highlight our major difference. In War and Ethnicity: the Role of Warfare in the Formation, Self-Images and Cohesion of Ethnic Identities, Smith argues in sum that war has been a powerful factor in shaping certain crucial aspects of ethnic communities and nationhood. He points to Georg Simmels cohesion thesis, which asserts that external armed conflict or the imminent threat thereof produces all internal group solidarity (Smith 1981, XX). In so doing, Smith turns war and its variations into an independent variable that moulds the ethnic community, and invariably the nation. Though I do agree that war and conflict certainly have the ability to accentuate and exacerbate group identity and cohesion, I contend to the contrary that group cohesion is the primary cause of war and conflict. As su ch, war is the dependent variable that finds its existence and explanation in the more common group aggression theory. Thus, it is not war that creates a sense of belonging and community, but a sense of community and belonging that leads to war and conflict and the sense of belonging and community within the Covenant Nation typifies that. The Rise of the Nation-State: Context vs. Cognition To suggest that Israel is in fact an inherently violent nation-state on account of the Covenant, it is necessary to first dispel the myth that all nation-states are violent, and to trace Israels legacy back beyond its establishment. A long-standing assumption among several prominent political theorists suggests that all nation-states are inherently violent because they are forged in warfare. Richard Bean, in War and the Nation State, argues that beginning in the fourteenth century changes in the art of war inextricably led to the rise of centralized states for the purpose of raising taxes (Bean 1973, 220). It is possible, however, that the nation-state by general concept, if not by definition predates medieval changes in the art of war, and certainly Westphalia. Greek city-states, like Sparta, can be seen as examples of very homogeneous societies with developed political structures, taxation, and mutual obligations between government and citizens. Regardless, ancient historical cas es such as these would likely only serve to highlight the linkage between warfare and the birth of the nation-state. On the other end of the spectrum, what can be said about nation-states that have emerged contemporarily? Taking Israel as an example, a state that came into being by means of a vote in the United Nations, it is easy to suggest that the Arab-Israeli wars following its establishment have played a prominent role in the shaping of modern-day Israel. However, shaping by definition is not synonymous with forging. In the first instance, it is my intention to show that nation-states are not forged explicitly in warfare, but on traditions of warfare wherever derived. The purpose is to rephrase the hypothesis that nation-states are forged in warfare into one more universally applicable. For this, it is necessary to first presume that the nation, with its sense of community and belonging, existed prior. It will be shown that; from (i) a nations strategic culture, come (ii) traditions of warfare, which (iii) lead to a greater sense of national identity, on which (iv) nation-states have been forged. In so doing, I move the discourse away from a contextually derived theory of nationalism to a more cognitive-based approach, in which Anthony D. Smiths contributions to ethnosymbolism (as outlined above) figure prominently. A nation-states strategic culture is the obvious place to look for evidence of a war-born society. Strategic culture is defined by Alistair Iain Johnston as an ideational milieu which limits behavior choices. This milieu consists of shared assumption and decision rules that impose a degree of order on individual and group conceptions of their relationship to their social, organizational or political environment (Johnston 1995, 34). Essentially, it all comes down to security. A strategic culture is shaped from a shared sense of self-perception and threat perception of a specific group of people. It is necessary to assume that if a national group has a strong historical sense of war, aggressiveness, victimization, and/or persecution, that these sentiments would play out in their strategic culture, and would limit behavior choice and influence decision-making. Once forged into nation-states these strategic cultures continue to exist, and therefore become good indicators of how groups vi ew warfare and how their states came into being. In order to analyze a nation-states strategic culture properly, it is important to consider that the study of strategic culture itself has two distinct epistemological approaches context and cognition. Those that believe a strategic culture is based in context would claim that the historical record of the nation, even before its conception as a nation-state, is important to study. Basically, the nation-state expresses its national identity based on its national character. Therefore, a states strategic culture is based on its past it is path dependent. On the other hand, cognitivists see strategic culture as an integrated system of symbols (Johnston 1995, 35). Included in this integrated system of symbols are structures, languages, analogies, myths, metaphors, etc. In this approach national identity, as related to strategic culture, is more easily discernable through the study of a nation-states wartime symbols than a nation states wartime history. Carolyn Marvin and David Ingle, in their book Blood Sacrifice and the Nation, also argue that symbols (like a flag) can be very telling indicators that lead one to uncover the nature of nationalism that exists within a state. In Fallen Soldiers, George Mosse looks to nation-states war memorials: cemeteries, songs, poems and commemorations, for clues. Essentially, a nations sentiments regarding warfare might differ from its experience; they might have been shaped or molded. When trying to find the link between the birth of a nation-state and warfare, symbols offer yet another variable to consider. Due to the fact that there are two different ways to approach the study of strategic culture, and by association an element of a nation-states national identity, a clear distinction can be made between proper warfare and traditions of warfare. Traditions, like symbols, need not be based on truth or historical accuracy. There is a tradition of Santa Clause bringing presents to nice children despite there being no assumption of truth behind such a practice and certainly no historical record to legitimize it. Traditions are sometimes developed more because they serve a purpose, than because they truly commemorate something. When considering nation-state formation it is important to properly choose which traditions are worth investigating. Relating to strategic culture, or any issue that shapes a nation-states identity, it is important that a tradition have; (i) solid national support, (ii) outlived the era that gave it birth, (iii) entered the permanent lexicon of national discourse, and (iv) continued to resonate with a portion of public opinion even at a time when it was not directly affecting public policy (McDougall, Ch.1). As will be shown with the case of Israel, traditions of warfare that have passed the scrutiny of the limitations listed above have played a role in developing national identity, and ultimately forging a nation-state. Modern day Israel is a good example of a nation-state forged on traditions of warfare, and not explicitly in warfare. As suggested above the first place to look for evidence of the link between warfare and state formation would be in a nation-states strategic culture. Israels strategic culture has long been dominated by the realist tradition (Dowty 1998, 84). The realist view of security has solid national support in Israel, it has outlived the era that gave it birth, it has entered the permanent lexicon of national discourse, and even during times of relative peace it continues to resonate with a portion of public opinion. Israels strategic culture is not only realist with regards to self-defense, but also in its offense. The leftist scholars who would date Zionism to Theodor Herzls avowedly socialist ideals of establishing a free, humanitarian and egalitarian state in the Jewish homeland to escape the increasing anti-Semitism of late-nineteenth century Europe (Avineri, 1981, 88-89) are shortsighted in their efforts. There is no such thing as nineteenth and twentieth century Zionism it is only Zionism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The bleak and destructive history of the Jews in Europe plays little significance in Israeli mamlachtiyut, or statism. The traditions that have forged the Israeli nation-state and limit its behavior choices can and should be dated back to the Hebrew Bible. For example, one might choose to examine the myth of the Covenant Nation, and how that played out during the Hebrews first experiment with forging a state following Joshuas invasion of Canaan, as evidence. The invasion represents a realist tradition of conquering and occupying. Whether or not the Hebrew Bible represents an accurate historical rendition or whether it has any academic merit at all is outside the scope of discussion. After all, when providing an account for Israels strategic culture, the scriptures can be analyzed as being contextually historical or as a symbol of cognition. Either way fact or fiction they provide a tradition from which to inherit a strategic culture from, and on which to forge a nation-state. Thus, the argument that Richard Bean makes; that nation-states developed out of the need for a strong central authority to levy taxes due to changes in the art of war, is unconvincing. To the point of emphasis, most modern economic-dependent nationalist arguments are limited when one considers ancient examples of national groups coming together to forge polities within defined and enunciated borders. Cases such as these simply highlight the fact that the forging of a nation-state draws more on myths, sentiments and symbols of collective fear, threat, pride, angst, aspiration, victimization, xenophobia and so forth when grouping together to organize politically. The above sentiments combine to form a strategic culture, from which traditions, national identity and greater cohesiveness are born. The nation-state was born as a response to a need for security; the traditions that transmit that feeling be they contextually or cognitively derived are what inevitably forge nation-states an d determine how violently they will behave. Though it may be true that many nation-states are forged explicitly in warfare (and are established using means of warfare), it is not a universal truth. Instead, it should be argued that nation-states are forged on traditions of warfare traditions that once were prescriptive and later become predictive. Covenant Nations As mentioned above, a strategic culture is shaped from a shared sense of self-perception and threat perception of a specific group of people. It is my assertion (to the contrary of international relations theorists) that Israels strategic culture has nothing to do with threat perception; geopolitical realities and security dilemmas are but moot points. Israel has adopted and further developed a strategic culture based solely on a particular tradition of self-perception that of the Covenant Nation. Defining the term Covenant Nation is not as simple as it may appear; its definition is hard to come by because it involves describing a process more than an entity. Simply put, the covenant is a tradition of ethnic election. The process of ethnic election is a multi-staged process requiring; (i) a sense of being singled out or chosen for a special purpose, (ii) a divine promise whether absolute or conditional made to the chosen people, and (iii) a belief that fulfillment of the covenant leads to worldly salvation (Smith 2003, 48-49). In short, the covenant is a tradition of a contractual agreement between God and His people. Simply put, the Covenant Nation, therefore, is the nation that enters and embodies the covenant. As stated above, traditions need not be based on historical truth or reality; in the ethnosymbolic approach traditions, myths and metaphors offer much the same credence to a debate on nationalism and national identity and thus can serve as an explanation for how nation-states behave. Let me begin by acknowledging that although the term Covenant Nation is rife with religious connotation, I do not intentionally seek to obscure the already blurred lines between religion and nationalism. In fact, I seek to avoid entering the scholarly debate about their ambivalent relationship entirely; I steer clear from scholars like Mark Juergensmeyer, whose work albeit fascinating seeks to compare and contrast the two phenomena and chart their historical interplay (Juergensmeyer 2006, 182). Instead, I point to a recent trend in thinking that sees nationalism itself as a form of belief-system or as a new religion of the people (Smith 2003, 42). George Mosse, in Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars, discusses how during the interwar period in Europe a civic religion of nationalism was born based on the cult of the fallen soldier (Mosse 1990, 104). If in Germany, for example, a civic religion of nationalism was born based on the cult of the fallen soldier, it c an be said that for Israel a civic religion of nationalism is born based on the cult of the chosen people and the cult of the Promised Land. The Covenant has always been the cornerstone of Israels national identity dating back to primordial times. The Hebrew Bible first marks the covenant that God makes with Abram in Genesis 12:2: I will make of you a great nation, and I will bless you. It is important to note that this verse not only represents the birth of the covenant, but at the same time the birth of the nation highlighting their interconnectedness. The nation and the covenant are thus co-determining and mutually implicating; the two entities are defined by their internal relationship, such that the two entities derive their meaning through their relationship and have no meaning or basis without the other. No reason is given as to why Abram (later Abraham) is selected to head the nation that will come to be known as the chosen people, but we are told that his progeny shall; (i) inherit the land of Canaan, and (ii) outnumber the dust of the earth (Gen. 12:7 and 13:6) outlining the divine promise. In return the covenant nation is obliged to circumcise their children (Gen. 17:7-10) and post-exodus to keep the laws and commandments that God gives unto his chosen people, the holy nation, at Mount Sinai (Exod. 19:4-6). Such are the terms of the covenantal contract; if the Chosen People follow Yahwehs rules, he will give them virtue, peace and prosperity [in the Promised Land]. If they are his holy servants, the scriptures say, he will bless them (Akenson 1992, 16). Furthermore, not only do Gods chosen people benefit from fulfillment of the covenant the whole world does. By fulfilling the covenant it is believed that Gods plan of salvation is advanced; so to speak, the salvation of all hinge[s] on the conduct of a special few (Smith 2003, 51). Therefore, it is to the conduct of the special few that we now shift our attention. If the renowned modernist scholar on nationalism Elie Kedourie is correct when he asserts that nationalism produces a kind of religious fanaticism that lends to conflict (Kedourie 1971, XX), the same must certainly hold true of covenantal nationalism and likely to an even greater degree. As stated earlier, covenant nations come under a seemingly contractual obligation to defend and secure the idea of; (i) a chosen people, in (ii) a Promised Land, using (iii) regular blood sacrifice. Furthermore, the fulfillment of the covenant sets the chosen people apart from other peoples both ethically and ritually: Ye shall be holy; for I the Lord your God am holy (Lev. 19:2). If fulfillment of the covenant that is following the laws and commandments within the Promised Land makes one holy and will lead to worldly salvation for all, than any/all efforts to attain that credo become morally indisputable. A self-r ighteous and realist strategic culture develops whereby any actions taken in fulfillment of the covenant become necessary, justified and self-vindicating. The strategic culture associated with the covenant has thus permeated throughout time in much the same way it was born manifested from a belief in choseness, holiness, and obligation. The Jewish nation has always found its grounding in the covenant whether in the times of Elijah or Hezekiah, Josiah or Nehemiah, the Maccabees or the Talmudic Sages [] all of these looked back to the founding charter of the covenant, not just as legitimation but as the grounding for their conception of the community of Israel and the unity of the Jewish people, which they sought to restore or deepen (Smith 2003, 63). It is on this sacred foundation that modern day Israel was also established. Nineteenth century political Zionism can be broken down into three competing schools of thought; (i) the Revisionist Zionists, (ii) the Labor Zionists, and (iii) the Religious Zionists. In many ways revisionist Zionism epitomizes what it means to be a covenant nation. Vladimir Zeev Jabotinsky, the founder of revisionist Zionism, believed that people are naturally born into nations and inherit its cultures and values. So to speak, individuals have very little choice regarding which nationalities they belong to. It was Jabotinskys belief that the Jews represent a particularly strong nation because despite the pressures of the Diaspora they always maintained their originality and distinctness(Dowty, 37). Furthermore, he insisted that the Jewish state be established in Palestine and trans-Jordan because it was the historical legacy of the Jews. On the other hand, Labor Zionism the most influential branch of Zionism at the time considered itself to be totally secular in nature. Aaron David Gordon, founder of Hapoel Hatzair, saw the Jewish life in the Diaspora as dependence and a lack of self-reliance. Building on German-Jewish philosopher Martin Bubers I and Thou, he sought to create a new covenant by reconnecting with the land using the religion of labor (Dowty, 39), and by replacing the old exiled Jew with a new self-reliant Jew. However, under the secular garb of Labor Zionism the language and intent of the original Abrahamic Covenant can be discerned (Smith 2003, 93). Ber Borochov, ideological founder of the Poalei Zion labor movement wrote that class struggles exist within national groups as well as between them, clearly acknowledging a difference between the Jewish nation and other peoples, and advocating an ethnic nationalism, rather than the more open and tolerant civic kind (Howe 2000, 236). For reasons such as th is he sought to establish a Jewish socialist state. It is important to note, however, that not any state would do for Labor Zionists the state was to be established in the Jewish homeland. To the point of emphasis, upon establishment of the state of Israel, David Ben-Gurion, the first Labor Prime Minister of Israel declared the uniqueness of the Hebrew people and the redemptive destiny of Israel on its own soil (Smith 2003, 92-93). In so doing he acknowledged Labor and Religious Zionism to be not only compatible, but complimentary. Religious Zionism was headed by Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook. While it is the usual view that Zionism is a sin and alien culture, a non-Jewish way of life, and that Jews should only return to the Promised Land after messianic redemption, Kook claimed that enhancing attachment to the land is an obligation (Dowty, 44). Essentially, Kook is advocating preparing the land for redemption and salvation and suggests that the secular Zionists are doing holy work by settling the Promised Land. Clearly in all three branches of Zionism the tradition of the covenant remains critical the four deep seated cultural resources that define the covenant nation, namely; community, territory, history and destiny, permeate all of their raisons dà ªtre. By 1948, the underlying dimensions of the covenant nation return to fruition and again form a unifying and legitimizing tradition like in times past. From this tradition a realist strategic culture was born that has; (i) solid national support, (ii) outlived the era that gave it birth, (iii) entered the permanent lexicon of national discourse, and (iv) continued to resonate with a portion of public opinion even during times of relative peace. Biblically, historically and contemporarily time and again the covenant h

birmingham bowling :: essays research papers

BIRMINGHAM BOWLING CENTERS The first bowling house in Birmingham is somewhat of a mystery. As happens so many times, it depends on whom you ask. Some say there was a bowling house on 1st Avenue North near the Old Terminal Station; while others say the YMCA had the first, with either two or four bowling lanes located in the YMCA building. It is agreed, however, that the first regularly used bowling center was opened in 1933 and known as The Phoenix Bowling Alley, located in the basement of the Phoenix Building at 1706 2nd Avenue North. It was a twelve- (12) lane house, owned and operated by Harry and Elizabeth Arnold. Its opening in 1933 coincided with the forming of the Greater Birmingham Bowling Association. First officers of the association were V.G. Shields - President, Manual A. Ellis -Secretary, and F. J. Stanton - Treasurer, and the Executive Committee included Dr. N. C. Glass, Jr. and M. A. Moran. The Phoenix Bowling Alley remained in business until the Phoenix Building burned down. During the 1930’s and until the war, Birmingham bowling, like most activities, was centralized in the downtown area - between 2nd and 5th Avenues North. Bowling Houses, in addition to Phoenix - in alphabetical order - were: Downtown (Birmingham) Bowling Lanes, Liberty Bowling Alley and Lucky Strike Lanes. Bowling grew in popularity after World War II and continued to grow through the fifties, and with this popularity, came an increase in bowling alleys: Tarrant City (8 lanes), Fairfield (6 lanes), Woodlawn (8 lanes), lrondale (16 lanes), Five Points South (12 lanes), and Chapman Lanes, later to be known as LoMac Bowl (16 lanes). Chapman Lanes got its name from one of the proprietors, Ben Chapman - the great major league baseball player from Birmingham. Marvin Lowry (Lo) and Joe McCorvey (Mac) purchased Chapman Lanes, and the name was changed to LoMac Bowl. It was not long until small 6-12 lane houses gave way to the modern automated centers. In the late 1950’s and into the 1960’s, came the introduction of today’s modern Bowling Centers. The first one to open in Birmingham was Holiday Bowl (32 lanes), followed by Bowl-O-Mac) LoMac Bowl closed and the name was reversed for the new center to read BowLoMac), Eastwood Bowl Roebuck, Ensley, Homewood, Pine Bowl, Trussville (later Cahaba), Green Springs, Vestavia Lanes, Star Bowl, Honey Lanes, El Dorado (later Super Bowl) and Riverview Lanes.

A Diet of Worms in the Digital Age :: Digital Technology Technological Papers

A Diet of Worms in the Digital Age I can’t prove it, but there is no doubt in my mind that textual arguments have been raging in scholarly circles for as long as there has been text to debate. In my mind’s eye I can see them: ancient Sumerian scribes lecturing each other about clay types and wedge depth; early Semitic peoples voting â€Å"no† on the vowel; medieval European scribes boldly pushing forward with punctuation, spaces between words, and the lower-case alphabet, and having heated debates on the long-term viability of the capital letter. And then came the printing press! Can you imagine the contention! What bold new vistas were opened up for scholarship! But anyone could publish anything—no matter what the quality! And surely, this spelled the doom of calligraphy. With the advent of the digital age, scholarly textual debate has simply entered a new phase. At issue here: what is the potential of digitally-powered scholarship, and how can that potential be realized? What approaches should we take in terms of format and methodology? William H. O’Donnell and Emily A. Thrush (â€Å"Designing a Hypertext Edition of a Modern Poem†) discuss the issues involved in designing hypertext editions of literature. Specifically, they refer to the edition of Yeats’s â€Å"Lapis Lazuli† that they designed. The main work to be studied, they feel (be it â€Å"Lapis Lazuli† or something else), must not be cluttered with visible links. They have devised a method of windowing that anticipates the modern â€Å"frames† format of Internet documents, and stress that any attempt at electronic analysis of a work of literature must be intuitively structured, easy to use, and customizable. Their edition of â€Å"Lapis Lazuli† appears well-constructed and functional and seems to have fairly broad appeal, but it seems also to be intended more as an aid to understanding the poem than as a tool for scholarly research. This distinction separates this article somewhat from the others considered her e, though the basic format could be applied to other projects. Peter Shillingsburg (â€Å"Principles for Electronic Archives, Scholarly Editions, and Tutorials†) frankly admits that what we all secretly want is to have every conceivable kind of information—textual, visual, audio—related to a given topic all sorted for us and available right at our fingertips. This is, of course, impossible, but he feels that electronic editions of scholarly works have the potential to come closer to that ideal than any other medium. He systematically lays out the main problems facing those who create electronic editions and suggests some ways to address them.

To the Snake by Denise Levertov :: essays research papers

In the poem 'To the Snake'; the author Denise Levertov use several writing techniques to portray money and gambling. She uses syntax, sound imagery, color imagery, figurative language, and symbolism to represent money and gambling. Symbolism is used cleverly throughout the poem to depict a number of things that would take numerous readings to see. Throughout the poem the sentences are structured so that every other sentence is indented, with exception to the first two and the last four. In those sentences not indented the author chose to make every other sentence shorter so that the ends were uneven. This syntax structure gives the reader the feeling of something hard to catch or control. The author did this because money, as it is depicted in the poem, is something this person can't handle. In other words this person can't get control of money, instead the want of money is controlling them. This introduces the idea of gambling into the poem. In the poem it says, '…I swore to my companions that certainly you were harmless!';, which is the typical statement of people addicted to gambling. Once again there is the control factor. This person can not control their desire for money and, the means of getting the money, gambling. Another important syntax technique can be seen in line 12. The poem says '…for that joy, whic h left a long wake of pleasure…'; The words 'which left'; are put on a line alone to draw attention to them. When read without stopping, the words make it seem as if, '…a wake of pleasure…';, was left. However, if the line is read again slowly, the line seems to say, '…that joy…';, left. The author did this to show that even though the joy left, the memory of pleasure was still there, which is why this person continues to gamble. ` Sound imagery is another writing technique put to use by Levertov in the poem. When reading the poem out loud, the reader notices the 'S'; sound. The misleading 'S'; or hissing sound could be interpreted, by some readers, to be the sound of a snake. It is instead the sound of money. When gambling, it is often necessary when betting on something to count money quickly. Paper money when rubbing together makes a hissing sound very much like the sound you get when reading the poem. The hissing could also be attributed to the sound of machines or people in a casino.

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Poverty is rampant in the Middle East, and the region's past, current and future water crisis plays a more significant role than what is shared in the major news. While the major focus of conflict is often attributed to the devastation of violent cultural war, countries that have been major victims will need rising leaders and peacekeepers to focus on the more significant issues as to begin with a strong foundation while they rebuild. The World Bank predicts that with rapid growth, regional ; cultural instability on top of climate change, these challenges are more pressing than ever before. Water accessibility has always posed great challenges for the Middle East. In the recent decades, the changes in both the economy and infrastructure of the Middle East have made its water challenges a growing issue, to the point where the lack of water conservation could negatively affect the infrastructure and stability of these countries in the future. Rapid population and economic growth in urban areas, increasing and wasteful water consumption, geographical challenges and inadequate governance to name a few. According to studies, climate change is causing more severe and frequent weather events. Political and social turmoil have also worsened existing constraints of water scarcity. Currently, poverty doesn't appear to discriminate against regions, whether stable or unstable. The water crisis in the Middle East plays a significant role when it comes to the population's hunger, food insecurity, and lack of food production. The Arab World is where 6% of the world's population is located. Only 2% of the world's water supply is located there. Rural unemployment occurs when the amount of suitable farmland decreased and desertification increases. As more of the population suffers from little agricultural cultivation, the Middle East sees a decrease in production, and farmers find themselves without jobs or food. The lack of security in water supplies and irrigation cannot sustain productive farmland and agriculture. With a more stable structure and plan for agriculture, climate smart agricultural practices and better irrigation methods will go a long way in conserving water. The public must be part of the conservation effort through awareness. A focus on minimizing water waste, as well as efficient energy usage at desalination plants will reduce the environmental cost of producing water. In such an arid region, there is no denying water takes on critical importance. However, some natural sources do exist, though they attract the attention of those geographically close to them. The issue is who gets to claim these sources. These less fortunate populations suffer due to this continuous conflict. The Golan Heights, for example, has long been a place of conflict for critical players in the Middle East. Countries like Syria, Lebanon and Israel are engaged in conflict over this area because it holds a strategic advantage. One-third of Israel's freshwater supply originates in the Golan Heights, and promotes fertile land, which stretches from the Sea of Galilee to the Jordan River. But while this source of water aides Israel, ceding control of the Golan Heights to Syria would give Syria access to the Sea of Galilee's eastern shore and one of Israel's two largest sources of water. In addition, Jordan and Lebanon would stand to benefit from its resources. But a lack of governed structure in place to allocate and value water in a way that is sustainable will affect the countries' ability to support a civilization that could flourish and their ability to get rid of the poverty caused from a lack of water structure. It is quoted that 60 percent of the surface water resources in the Arab region are transboundary, and all countries share at least one aquifer. This further highlights how important all of the countries' cooperation and solid management of shared water resources. As poverty continues, so will contention. Urban water systems that are in place will continue to be targets of armed conflicts. Countries recovering from war and decimated infrastructure, for example, see leaking water pipes; meaning that some cities lose up to 40% of their water before it reaches the users. Ultimately, entities such as ISIL, Al Qaeda, and the Kurdish forces are perpetuated by this conflict, as they leverage their advantage and control over regions with reliable water sources. With precious and limited natural resources in the hands of these entities, there is little hope of the wealth to be shared or structured. As the economic, social and political pressures mount in the Arab world, the international focus will need to shift its focus to security and communication to avoid engagement in conflict. The above issues and nature of water scarcity and its implications for growth, prosperity and end to poverty cannot be sidelined in efforts at international dialogue and engagement.